From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Mon Mar 14 2005 - 19:14:47 GMT
Hi Marsha,
Splitting this off from the other thread, as I want to try and keep that to
the question of pure experience. You asked "How could one approach
addressing your "severe tension" without a clear explanation of what you
mean by "discovered or been taught". What are you comparing?"
My long term interlocutors (like DMB, Wim and Matt) have, I think, a pretty
good idea of where I'm coming from. But it's probably not a bad thing to try
and summarise my view.
I'd begin by saying that I think Pirsig is great, he's very lucid and
stimulating to read, and I always feel refreshed whenever I return to what
he has written (when I've had too much MD that is). I think ZMM is a work of
genius; Lila I'm not so convinced by. In other words, I think that in Lila
Pirsig reversed his decision in ZMM and decided to climb up the mountain of
metaphysics. So you could say that what I have problems with is the
'metaphysics' part of the MoQ, and not the Quality part. So I think the
language of Quality, SQ and DQ is tremendously fertile, and, with one more
or less significant modification (my 'eudaimonic' proposal), I am quite
comfortable with the different levels and how they inter-relate.
The severe tensions are really reducible to two.
Firstly, I think the way that DQ is described within the system of the MoQ
has great difficulties. I think Pirsig has retained influences from the
empirical tradition that are no longer sustainable. I think that 'pure
experience' doesn't do what he wants it to do, and that it is in many ways a
confused notion in and of itself. The way out of this tension seems to me to
be something along the lines of Scott's 'contradictory identity' which
doesn't privilege DQ over SQ, and abandoning the language of empiricism that
Pirsig has retained.
Secondly, I think the MoQ is a metaphysical structure that pre-dates
Wittgenstein. I don't think it's possible to do metaphysics in quite the
same way once Wittgenstein has been taken on board; it's 'status' is
different. This is what I'm wanting to pursue with Anthony. In other words,
I think that - because, so far as I know, he's never read any Wittgenstein -
Pirsig is still employing some residual Cartesian assumptions about
'philosophical psychology'. I think that the MoQ can survive the removal of
these assumptions, I just think that the way the levels are understood will
be modified (the social level will not be 'subjective' in any sense, for
example).
I'm happy to further unpack these if you like.
Sam
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