From: Scott Roberts (jse885@cox.net)
Date: Wed Aug 31 2005 - 19:26:48 BST
David M, Paul,
Scott said:
The usual use of "essentialist" in philosophy is to claim the reality
of the
> essence of things beyond the transitory appearance ("existence") of
> things.
> It is, as far as I can tell, the same universalist stand as opposed to the
> nominalist: horses are horses because they have partake in horseness,
> which
> exists (if one is an essentialist) in addition to the particular horses. A
> Platonic Form, in short, which a nominalist or anti-essentialist (same
> thing, as far as I can see) will call "just" a word or concept.
>
DM said:
Materialism is also essentialist in terms of claiming that there
is some ultimate simple that is more real than other phenomena.
Scott:
Rorty, for example, I would call an anti-essentialist materialist. He makes
no claim about ultimate anything. But claiming ultimate whatevers is not
what I mean by "essentialist". An essentialist claims that essences are real
beyond their use in human language.
Scott said:> However, suppose one doesn't insist that all essences be
eternal and
> unchanging. Then the MOQ would appear to be essentialist, only it calls
> essences "static patterns of value".
DM said:
I think that is bending the word too far, if it is
historical/contingent/chosen it is not essential.
Scott:
An essence is essential (to provide value). As I said to Paul, I think you
are bringing in a connotation of the word "essential" that I am not. As long
as a word means something, that something is the essence of the word. The
word's meaning can change, in which case its essence is different from what
it was. Now you could object that I should just stick with "concept" and not
"essence", but one of the points I am trying to make is that for
philosophical purposes -- if one does not associate "essence" with
permanence -- the two words serve the same function.
What I am trying to point out is that language depends on essences, that is,
universals, the meanings of words. The universalist/nominalist debates of
the Middle Ages were about whether essences were real beyond their usage in
human language. So what I am first saying is the obvious point that value
(meaning) in human language clearly depends on essences, though in this
context, essences are usually called concepts. In this context, the value of
a word depends on its manifesting a concept, and the value of a concept
depends on its being manifested by a word. Thus the existent (a particular
speech act) depends on the essent (more accurately, a network of essences),
and the value of the essent requires the existent. As I say, within human
language, this is obvious.
So what I am claiming is that this same situation applies at all levels,
that value arises in an existent only because it manifests an essent (a
SPOV). A materialist does not need to accept this, because the materialist
can deny that there is value except in the human subject. But that is not
the case for the MOQ, because the MOQ does claim that there is value at all
levels. And value, or so I claim, requires this essent/existent interaction,
and the name for that interaction is semiosis.
- Scott
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