Re: MD The intelligence fallacy (was Rhetoric)

From: Arlo Bensinger (ajb102@psu.edu)
Date: Thu Sep 15 2005 - 18:11:06 BST

  • Next message: Scott Roberts: "Re: MD Essentialist and anti-essentialist"

    Scott,

    At 02:26 AM 9/15/2005, you wrote:
    >Arlo (Ian mentioned),
    >
    >Carefully stated, but inconclusive. Consider that there is a growing notion
    >(said by Ian, for example) that says that inorganic and biological processes
    >are informational. Consider also that this information is valued (if one
    >holds with the MOQ). As I see it, to speak of valued information is to speak
    >of language, and so, even though it isn't people speaking at the inorganic
    >and biological levels, the levels are semiotic.

    Well, to be honest I haven't been following the entire thread. I tried to
    go back through this morning and figure out what you mean by this, or what
    Ian is referring to, but wasn't really able to make much progress. So, at
    the risk of prompting repetition, let me just answer you on this point.

    No. I don't believe biologic and inorganic level "experience" to be
    semiotic. Semiosis is, to me, an emergence at the social level (I break
    with Pirsig on what constitutes entities on the social level, he seems to
    suggest things such as cities, nations, etc, are social level
    "individuals". I disagree with that, and propose that cities, nations, etc.
    are physical/material artifacts of social-level, semiotically-mediated
    "individuals" such as "Arlo". Intellectual-level patterns are semiotic as
    well, as they emerge from a collective of social-level semiotic activity.)

    Semiosis is, by definition, the ability to represent symbolically
    "experience" and to "relive" symbolically represented experience of
    yourself and others. An atom electron experiences inorganic Quality but
    does not represent that experience symbolically, or share in the
    symbolically represented experience of other electrons.

    > Would you consider this to
    >be idealism as well? If you disagree that to speak of valued information is
    >to speak of language, what additional feature does language have that valued
    >information processing does not?

    I'm not really sure I follow. "Information", as I use the term, refers to a
    "library" of symbolically represented experiences of a oneself and others.
    So, I don't disagree with your using "language" to encapsulate the "valued
    information" of a social collective. As for what additional feature
    language has, I would emphasis its historical dialectic. That is, it has a
    vertical temporal axis not just a horizontal spread. So, "language" is not
    just what I use to speak with you, but allows Kant to speak with us, and
    allows us to speak to a undefined future interlocutor.

    >What about my claim that value implies
    >awareness of value? Do you consider that idealism also? If you disagree that
    >value implies awareness of value, what makes unconscious value valuable?

    Again, Scott, I'm a little lost here. It seems to me you are using the term
    "awareness" as somewhat synonymous with social-semiotic representations.
    Maybe that's where you lose me. As social beings, we are so tied to our
    semiotic "selves" that its hard to imagine "awareness" that is not somehow
    semiotically mediated. Iron fillings that move towards a magnet experience
    value, but there is no semiotic awareness of this event. When you ask,
    "What makes unconscious value valuable?" you are really asking "What makes
    pre-semiotic (or asemiotic) value valuable?" (I think). This precludes your
    asking "Is there such thing as asemiotic experience?", which you've stated
    the reply "no".

    So, if I'm following correctly, you are asking me to semiotically describe
    non-semiotic experience. I don't believe that's possible, since in order to
    semiotically describe it, one has to be able to experience it semiotically.
    I do believe we are capable, of course, of non-semiotic "being" (or
    presemiotic (Eco) or protosemiotic (Peirce)). But that experience cannot be
    represented by the social semiotic. It is akin to the Incompleteness Theorum.

    Hopefully this answers at least one of your questions of my perspective on
    this...

    Arlo

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