MD Emotions and subjectivity

From: Michael Hamilton (thethemichael@gmail.com)
Date: Fri Nov 25 2005 - 12:46:51 GMT

  • Next message: Michael Hamilton: "Re: MD Quality, subjectivity and the 4th level"

    Hi everyone,

    In the "intellectual level and rationality" thread, Paul took Bo to
    task on the topic of emotions:

    Bo wrote:
    > >From Quality's meta-premise the social
    > >level is neither subjective nor objective, it was the 4th level that
    > >brought this distinction into existence. From its premises all social
    > >patterns - included emotions - are subjective while itself is
    > >objectivity.
    >
    > Paul: I thought the SOL said that intellect is "subjectivity/objectivity
    > itself," not "objectivity itself." But anyway, according to the SOL,
    > emotions belong at the social level, right? But wait...
    >
    > >Let me try again: The dictionary defines "intellect" from within the
    > >4th level, and predictably sees it as REASON divided from
    > >EMOTION. From Quality's meta position the perspective opens
    > >up and the 4th level becomes the S/O distinction itself
    > >(emotion=subjective/reason=objective)
    >
    > So, emotions belong in the intellectual level now, do they? As you have
    > also previously stated to me that logic is found at the social level we are,
    > once again, starting to see the SOL fall apart at the seams. Anger is now
    > at a higher level of morality than inference.
    >
    > But later you spin the wheel again...
    >
    > >However, emotions will never
    > >coincide with the intellectual level - that's different levels
    >
    > Paul: If emotions are subjective and all variations of subjective/objective
    > reality exist at the intellectual level then surely emotions do coincide
    > with the intellectual level. They are part of the dichotomy from which,
    > according to you, the intellectual level is comprised.

    Mike:
    Paul is correct that, to the SOM worldview, emotions fall squarely
    into the realm of the subjective. Bo claims that, when we move to the
    so-called "Quality meta-premise", emotions really fall into the social
    level, but I haven't seen any argumentation for this.

    I think that to investigate the status of emotions, we need to bring
    in the evidence of Barfield's history of words (which is a history of
    meanings, and therefore a history of consciousness). In "History Of
    English Words" there is a chapter titled "Personality and Reason",
    showing how the two diverged sharply as the "consciousness of 'myself'
    and the distinction between 'my-self' and all other selves, the
    antithesis between 'myself', the observer, and the external world, the
    observed" (in other words, SOM) was achieved. From that chapter
    (emphasis mine):

    "The nomenclature of the Middle Ages generally views [feelings and
    passions] from without, hinting always at their results or their moral
    significance--'envy', 'greedy', 'happy' (i.e. lucky), 'malice',
    'mercy', 'mildheartedness', ' peace', 'pity', 'remorse', 'repentance',
    'rue', 'sin', ... Even the old word 'sad' had not long lost its sense
    of sated, heavy, ... and 'fear' continued for a long time to mean, not
    the emotion, but 'a sudden and unexpected event'. HARDLY BEFORE THE
    BEGINNING OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY do we find that sympathetic or
    INTROSPECTIVE attitude to the feelings which is conveyed by such
    labels as 'aversion', 'dissatisfaction', 'discomposure', ...while
    'depression' and 'emotion'...were used until then of material objects.

    "In the eighteenth century we notice, as we should expect, a
    considerable increase in the number of these words which attempt to
    portray character or feeling FROM WITHIN; such as 'apathy', 'chagrin',
    'diffidence', 'ennui', 'homesickness', together with the expression
    'the feelings', while 'agitation', 'constraint', 'disappointment',
    'embarrassment', 'excitement' are transferred from the outer to the
    inner world. 'Outlook', which meant 'a place from which a good view is
    obtained', was first used figuratively by Dr Young in 1742."

    So, most tellingly, "feelings", "emotion" and "outlook" did not have
    their modern meanings before the infiltration of SOM into England. To
    better illustrate the change, I'd like to repeat some Ken Wilber as
    quoted by Platt:

    "So tell me: Who are you?

    "You are not your thoughts, for you are aware of them. You are not your
    feelings, for you are aware of them. You are not any objects that you can
    see, for you are aware of them, too.

    "What is it in you that is always awake? Always full present? Something in
    you right now is effortlessly noticing everything that arises. What is
    that?

    "That vast infinite witnessing awareness, don't you recognize it? What is
    that Witness?

    "You are that Witness, aren't you? You are the pure Seer, pure awareness,
    the pure Spirit that impartially witnesses everything that arises, moment
    to moment. Your awareness is spacious, wide open, empty and clear, and yet
    it registers every thing that arises."

    Mike:
    The thing to realise is that, whatever Wilber says about the Witness
    not being one's feelings (emotions), it is nonetheless this Witness
    that, in the 17th century, emotions began to be ascribed to. That's
    because the Witness, or detached subject, didn't exist in England
    before the 17th century. Human beings were previously thought to
    participate in their environment, not observe it. Therefore what we
    term the emotions of human beings were felt to arise from this
    participation, not from the intangible realm of the Witness. Although,
    as Wilber implies, we are capable of detaching ourselves from our
    emotions just as well as everything else, it is nevertheless true
    that, most of the time, we don't.

    Platt commented on Wilber:
    So Ian, the word you may be looking for, and what Bo may be referring to,
    is the "Witness."

    Mike:
    I think it's certainly what Bo SHOULD be referring to. It's the
    detached, subjective consciousness that makes intellect possible. It's
    the essence of level 4. Whether, like Descartes, we ascribe thoughts
    and emotions to the Witness, or whether, like Wilber, we do not, the
    really significant thing is the Witness itself.

    In conclusion, emotions/feelings, as we know them, are 4th-level
    artifacts. To a level-3 consciousness, i.e. a "participating"
    consciousness as opposed to an intangible, detached, "inner"
    consciousness..... well, we are looking at something very different
    altogether.

    Regards,
    Mike

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