From: David R (elephant@plato.plus.com)
Date: Sun Nov 23 2003 - 16:38:48 GMT
Scott,
I grasped perfectly well that you were making a negative claim about
correspondence, namely that it does not work in such and such cases. But in
order for you to make that negative statement you must *mean* something by
'correspondence', and so everything I have said about your explanation of
that concept applies.
I have't a perfect grasp yet of your claim that "sense perception is a kind
of language", partly because we still haven't gotten to the bottom of what
you mean by "sense-perceptible", to which point my puma question is
addressed.
As I have explained, the relevance of my question is to your claim to know
what you are saying with 'correspondence', and *not* to the particular claim
you are making about it (viz that it doesn't hold for generalities).
That explained, what's your response to my last email?
David R
> From: "Scott R" < >
> Reply-To:
> Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2003 22:05:57 -0700
> To: < >
> Subject: Re: MD matt said scott said
>
> David R,
>
> You don't seem to grasp that my point in saying that truth by correspondence
> only works when the statement is about sense-perceptible particulars was to
> point out that it does NOT work with statements about generalities, or about
> particulars that are not public, like thoughts and feelings. Here is my
> original statement (to Platt):
>
> "Thus you miss the point when you give examples that are true by
> correspondence. Truth by correspondence only works when the example
> consists of sense-perceptible particulars, as is the case in your examples.
> But
> as soon as generalities are involved, truth by correspondence doesn't work."
>
> So the only thing I care about is if someone disputes this by claiming that
> truth by correspondence DOES work with generalities. I don't care -- in this
> context -- whether there are philosophical difficulties with saying that it
> actually does work with sense-perceptible particulars. I am aware that there
> are such difficulties, as there always are with questions about perception,
> but don't want to bother with them in this context because they do not
> concern my point. My main concern -- that it does not work when generalities
> are involved -- holds even if there were no difference between physical
> sight and insight, since those are both particulars. I would not be
> concerned if the notion of "truth by correspondence" should be shown to be
> unworkable in all cases.
>
> Since your main concern seems to be perception, I can say that I am aware
> that there is a heavy cognitive role involved in ordinary perception. It is
> also my perhaps crackpot view that sense perception is a kind of language,
> and can be thought of as the creation of spatio-temporal forms out of
> non-spatio-temporal whatever. If you want to start a separate discussion on
> perception then that is where I would chime in, though I'm not inclined to
> at this time since I've probably talked about it enough already in past
> discussions, and I really ought to stick more closely to discussions more
> relevant to the MOQ. See the archives if you're interested.
>
> - Scott
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "David R" < >
> To: < >
> Sent: Saturday, November 22, 2003 1:02 PM
> Subject: Re: MD matt said scott said
>
>
>> Scott,
>>
>> Thanks for your first answer to the puma question. You preface it by
>> complaining once again that you can't see why anyone would think that it
> is
>> in the least bit important, so I will deal with that.
>>
>> Look, this is really simple.
>>
>> If you explain what 'correspondence' means by reference to something
> called
>> 'sense perceptible particulars' ("correspondence works for sense
> perceptible
>> pariculars") then, obviously, in order to understand what you are saying
>> about correspondence (whatever it is you are saying about correspondence),
>> we will have to understand what you mean by 'sense perceptible
> particulars'.
>>
>> Clear?
>>
>> Now, you offer an explanation of 'sense perceptible' as 'physical sight',
> as
>> contrasted with 'insight or understanding'. Ok. Fine. So tell me how
> this
>> applies to actual cases of seeing things, and I will know what you mean by
>> the contrast between 'physical sight' and 'insight'.
>>
>> That's all I want to do, understand what you are saying. My request for
>> application of your distinction to actual cases is a reasonable one. The
>> physical sight/ insight distinction is what your explanation of
>> 'correspondence' has come down to, and it it turns out that you can't
> apply
>> the 'insight'/'physical sight' distinction in practice we will have to
> start
>> over.
>>
>> You may think (you seem to suggest this) that it is so increadibly simple
> to
>> clarify this fantastically easy point that it's not worth even raising it
>> unless one is preternaturally stupid.
>>
>> Ok, in that case, there's nothing to be lost by *showing* me how simple it
>> is to clarify the point, namely, by actually clarifying it. Wouldn't that
>> be the simplest way of dealling with me?
>>
>> So let's come to the answer which you now reluctantly give to my question.
>> Here was the question again:
>>
>> David R (previously):
>> Scott has offered the following outstanding clarification of 'sense
>> perceptible':
>>
>>> Sense-perceptible particulars are the objects and events we see, hear,
>>> touch, smell, and taste. By "see" (to refer to your later post) I mean
>>> physical sight, not insight or understanding.
>>
>> [...]
>>
>> What makes something a case of "physical" sight as opposed to "insight"?
>>
>> Try some actual cases of 'I see'.
>>
>> I'm walking home about 5pm in the deepening winter gloom in the dark eyes
> of
>> the forest, and I look up into the branches. I'm startled. I *see* the
>> silouette of a long catty tail hanging down, and the mass of a couched
>> animal. Immediately, without any pause for thought, I find myself stopped
>> and looking up, expecting a growl to emminate - Oh no, that myth about the
>> puma on the prowl: no myth.
>>
>> But no low growl comes. And no flash of eyes. And the movement in the
>> coiling 'tail' is the same for all the trees, just wind. And now I *see*
>> that it's just a knarled branch in a welsh forest, not a hungry killer.
>>
>> Ok, help me out. Is this a case of "physical sight", or of "insight"?
>>
>>> Scott answers:
>>> It was a hallucination. Call it neither, or call it a case of physical
> sight
>>> that got corrected. What difference does it make?
>>
>> David R:
>> (1) if the two cases of seeing in the example are *neither* physical sight
>> nor insight/understanding, then your theoretical contrast between
> 'physical
>> sight' and 'insight' doesn't apply to seeing in the real world.
>>
>> That's a difference it makes.
>>
>> (2) if we treat the seeing of the puma as a case of hallucination (an
>> erroneous understanding) and the seeing of the branch as 'corrected'
>> physical sight, then it appears that we will have no way of explaining the
>> fact that factors of *insight and understanding* are involved in realising
>> that it's a branch (we recall the wind, we get no growl).
>>
>> That's a difference it makes.
>>
>> (3) if neither case is in fact a case of 'physical sight', then it will
> seem
>> that we can get by perfectly well without the concept of 'physical sight',
>> and the distinction upon which you base your explanation of
> 'correspondence'
>> will have to be abandoned.
>>
>> That's a difference it makes.
>>
>>
>> More generally, my motivating concern is that you may (for all I know) be
>> unable to disentangle 'physical sight' from 'insight', and that being
>> incapable of this, you will turn out not to have meant anything in
>> particular by either 'sense perceptible' or 'correspondence'.
>>
>> Thus, there is no call for you to ask *me* whether I deny the existence of
>> 'sense perceptible particulars', since I have no clear idea of what you
> mean
>> by the term, and rather good reasons for thinking that you mean nothing at
>> all by it.
>>
>> Prove me wrong by successfully applying your 'insight and understanding'
> v.
>> 'physical sight' contrast to some actual examples of seeing.
>>
>>
>> David R
>>
>>
>>
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