MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic

From: Ant McWatt (antmcwatt@hotmail.co.uk)
Date: Sun Feb 20 2005 - 15:18:43 GMT

  • Next message: Erin: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    Scott Roberts stated February 18th:

    >I've read Bohm's book, and am underwhelmed.

    Ant McWatt states:

    Scott,

    Sorry to hear to hear you were “under whelmed” by Bohm's "Wholeness & the
    Implicate Order". I wonder if Krishnamurti felt the same way.

    >What this and other process philosophies overlook is awareness.

    Ant McWatt states:

    I think it would be helpful if you could explain why in greater detail.

    >If reality were entirely in the rheomode, there would be no awareness…

    Ant McWatt states:

    This doesn’t follow. Buddhist philosophy and modern physicists point
    towards reality being primarily in the rheomode.

    >which requires the contradictory
    >identity of things versus events, or continuity versus change.

    Ant McWatt states:

    So awareness (which is an experience) requires intellectual constructions to
    operate? That’s a bit like saying a motorcyclist needs to be able to
    explain the workings of an internal combustion engine in order to ride a
    bike or an apple falls downwards because of the theory of gravity. A rider
    rides, an apple falls irrespective of the theories concerning why and how
    these events happen.

    >If all is flux, how is there awareness of flux?

    Ant McWatt states:

    A part of the flux becomes aware of another part of the flux?

    >How is it that rain can be considered to be *still* happening?

    Ant McWatt states:

    Scott. Your phrasing is ambiguous here so it is not clear what you are
    trying to convey.

    >Ant McWatt stated:
    >
    >The MOQ's use of the four static levels and Dynamic Quality does not
    >preclude it from using the rheomode. I'd love to see an SOM philosophy
    >even
    >attempt to.
    >
    >Scott:
    >Materialism, a la Dennett is a SOM philosophy that does.

    Ant McWatt states:

    It would be helpful if you could please state the particular text where
    Dennett uses the rheomode. Seeing is believing!

    >Ant McWatt stated:
    >
    >I think the differences between materialism and the MOQ are actually
    >fundamental.
    >
    >Firstly, materialism tends to take statements about reality literally while
    >- instead -the MOQ takes statements about reality as provisional high
    >quality ideas i.e. more figuratively.
    >
    >Scott:
    >I don't see this, at least since Kuhn. Pretty much any thinker is aware of
    >the provisional nature of all theoretical constructs.

    Ant McWatt states:

    I still think that the emphasis on the provisional nature of our thoughts
    about what constitutes reality is stronger in the MOQ than most modern
    philosophies. Moreover, notice the word “tend” and “more” in my original
    paragraph.

    >Ant said:
    >Secondly, materialism sees everything in the universe as being composed of
    >physical substance while the MOQ sees it as composed of value - physical
    >substance being just one (probable) manifestation of value.
    >
    >Scott:
    >True, this is different. But as I have argued, a manifestation of value
    >only
    >makes sense if there is awareness of value.

    Ant McWatt states:

    Well, I think this is the crux of the matter. Pirsig is assuming that all
    there has been and all there ever will be are values. If awareness is
    defined as self-consciousness it has only developed relatively recently and
    will possibly disappear at some point in the future.

    To deny that values are self-contained is to re-introduce SOM via having a
    “senser” and “something sensed”.

    David Buchanan stated February 20th:

    Scott is exactly wrong. In fact, one could make a case that the MOQ takes
    much of it shape by opposing materialism and theism. To accurately describe
    materialism and theism is to accurately describe what the MOQ is NOT and is
    against. It’s remarkable, really. It’s like Scott has made a game of it and
    has devoted himself to avoiding correct interpretations at all costs.

    Ant McWatt adds:

    Why I think this is happening is because Scott still hasn’t got his head
    around the fundamental tenet of the MOQ i.e. that (ontologically) values
    come before subjects and objects, not simultaneously with them and certainly
    not before them. Without taking this tenet fully on board, confusion
    regarding Pirsig’s work will follow.

    >The MOQ is silent on this.

    Of course it is because it isn’t a form of SOM!

    >Was there consciousness before the biological level came into being?

    No. But of course, like “awareness”, consciousness is one of those slippery
    words in philosophology and philosophy. To return to my point with
    “experience”, this is why it is important (if wanting to avoid the
    production of nonsense) to place a particular’s philosopher understandings
    of terms in the context of their own paradigm.

    >Ant said:
    >Thirdly, static quality patterns and DQ are both designed to take account
    >of
    >value not just DQ alone
    >
    >Scott:
    >But my complaint about the MOQ is that DQ is seen as simply that which
    >makes
    >new SQ out of old. How is this different from an Intelligent Design theory?

    Intelligent Design Theory has pre-set static ends. The MOQ has an
    open-ended Dynamic “end”. A critical difference in my opinion.

    >Ant said:
    >Fourthly, the chasm caused by the mind-matter split in SOM is bridged in
    >the
    >MOQ by its reduction of mind and matter to value patterns. Chapter 3 of my
    >PhD thesis goes into this in great detail.
    >
    >Scott:
    >But (as I have argued) value implies awareness of value,

    Only if you take an SOM stance. The MOQ is intuitively “wrong” for the
    typical Western mind and it is this priority of subjects and objects before
    values which need to be mentally broken. Pirsig argues that metaphysics is
    improved by placing values first and I think you should examine the
    pragmatic results and consequences of his “Copernican inversion” in order to
    judge the merits of his system rather than begging the question in the first
    place.

    >which is the
    >interplay of universals and particulars, which is intellect. As long as the
    >MOQ sees intellect as only one hierarchical level, it has split mind and
    >matter a la SOM.

    No, it hasn’t because unlike SOM, the MOQ perceives mind and matter as the
    same type of fundamental ‘substance’. Similar looking pews but different
    churches.

    >Ant said:
    > >the MOQ has added DQ to account for value and as a means for development
    >up
    > >the levels (in which role it seems to me to be theistic).
    >
    >I don't think "theism" is a good term to apply in the context of the MOQ.
    >It implies incorrectly that Dynamic Quality has a personality or is
    >supernatural or can be prayed to or is fundamentally separate from the
    >static quality patterns.
    >
    >Scott:
    >Something that can make new SQ out of old is supernatural, unless you say
    >it
    >"just happens", as a materialist would.

    So if I build a motorbike from various mechanical components or make an
    omelette from two eggs this is supernatural? You’re expanding the term
    “supernatural” so much as to make it meaningless. Anyway, that static
    patterns value a new state of being does not entail a supernatural element.

    >Scott said:
    > >With respect to what you say here, I will point out that you emphasize
    > >language's role in discriminating, and hence limiting the full panoply of
    > >that of which it is possible to be aware. This can be turned around, by
    > >saying that language (or better, intellect) creates *by* discriminating.
    > >Without it there is only chaos. By making distinctions, reality comes
    >into
    > >being.
    >
    >Ant McWatt stated:
    >
    >I think this is an SOM (and incorrect) way of looking at things. In the
    >MOQ, "Being" (i.e. Dynamic Quality) is primary, out of this "Being" arises
    >intellectual patterns which in turn create distinctions. If "Being" was
    >chaotic (rather than composed of values) then the intellectual patterns
    >couldn't arise (because they would not be valued) and, in consequence, the
    >distinctions would not (eventually) arise.
    >
    >Scott:
    >I fail to see how saying that DQ is "composed of values" is compatible with
    >DQ being "undifferentiated".

    Ant McWatt states:

    “Composed” probably wasn’t the best term in this context. However, the fact
    remains that DQ (understood as the totality of existence) appears to be a
    process of value evolution rather than a state of chaos.

    >As I see it, what you have said here is on the
    >slippery slope to Platonic Ideas (or at least Plotinian Intellect), but
    >since that is more or less what I think -- subject to 2000+ years of
    >development --, then that is all to the good.

    Ant McWatt states:

    A conflation of intellect (as understood by Pirsig) with Dynamic Quality
    will be confusing if applied to the MOQ. A real spanner in the works which
    I oppose to.

    >Ant said:
    >Finally, Scott, I don't know if have got round to reading the Copleston
    >annotations by Pirsig yet (as Paul Turner and David Buchanan have recently
    >shown in their excellent posts over the last six weeks) but these may help
    >clear-up a few aspects of the MOQ for you.
    >
    >Scott:
    >I've read them. They haven't changed my view of the MOQ.

    Ant McWatt states: OK.

    >And that you call
    >posts in which the author (DMB) calls me "confused", "having a blindspot",
    >"hypnotized", "unable to read", because he misreads what I have I said,
    >responding abusively to imagined disagreements and not actual ones -- that
    >you call them "excellent" boggles my mind.

    Ant McWatt states:

    When I stated that David Buchanan’s posts were generally excellent I was
    referring to their intellectual content – the way David clarifies and
    expands various parts of the MOQ rather than referring to his insults.
    However, I can see why he (and Marsha) are frustrated with your recent posts
    because you are tending to distort the MOQ rather than clarifying or adding
    to it. Of course, that’s a generalisation as, on the other hand, you have
    made some very good observations. You wouldn’t be quoted twice in my PhD
    if that wasn’t the case!

    >Paul's though, are generally
    >helpful, though he has not of late responded to my criticisms, for example,
    >of whether or not the MOQ should be called empirical, by any definition.

    Ant McWatt states:

    I think the above paragraph comes back to what a particular philosopher
    understands by the term “empirical” rather than the generalisations of a
    standard undergraduate textbook. I therefore tend to agree with Ron
    Winchester’s line with this particular debate.

    Best wishes,

    Anthony.

    www.anthonymcwatt.co.uk

    _________________________________________________________________
    Use MSN Messenger to send music and pics to your friends
    http://www.msn.co.uk/messenger

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Feb 20 2005 - 15:23:47 GMT